An Anglo-French Deterrent for European NATO — But Everyone Has to Pay

Today, Europe’s nuclear forces — those of the UK and France —  are fairly capable, mostly reliant on the United States, and partially integrated. The deterrents might be termed somewhat ready, a description of the dubious deterrent effect.

With threats to West European democratic states proliferating, the continent needs to get its nuclear house in order as a matter of urgency.

NATO’s three nuclear-capable nations — with the United States easily the most significant — all currently deploy systems that are essentially Cold War legacy forces aimed to achieve strategic deterrence. All three are currently modernizing their mostly submarine-based systems. All three have their own domestic agendas and nuclear doctrines, even if they are a part of the same alliance.

All three are also entering an era of reinvesting in nuclear capabilities after years of relying on older command and control, warheads, and delivery platforms. This provides an opportunity for the two European nuclear states to create a unified European nuclear command structure and ensure that continental nuclear deterrence is effective, resilient, and encompasses all NATO territory.

Of course, there are significant practical and political barriers to this goal. Whose finger on the trigger is just one. Non-compliant allies like Hungary is another, and a UK-French deal on detail, both with one another and with the other allies, is a third. But no one can seriously question the need given the darkening international picture. And surely everyone has heard the laments of Ukrainians linking Russia’s outright aggression to their decision to play nice by agreeing to give up nuclear weaponry in 1994.

So, what needs to be done?

First, since the United States is faced with greatly increased geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific, it is likely to divert resources at critical junctures and may — given statements from the Republican presidential nominee, Donald Trump — not fight with Europe in a crisis. (Trump has also said the US “will 100%” stay in NATO if the alliance treats America fairly.)

However uncertainty is dangerous in geopolitics, and especially in deterrence theory. Europeans would be extremely rash to allow this to develop. This makes it an urgent matter to build a more capable self-standing European nuclear component.

Europe’s democracies can achieve this while avoiding greater nuclear proliferation, which they are pledged to avoid. As permanent members of the UN Security Council and long-established nuclear powers, the continent should design a system to maintain France and the United Kingdom as its nuclear-armed flag bearers. A European nuclear command within the NATO system would be formed by uniting the British and French nuclear forces.

By reinvesting in the European NATO nuclear arsenal and command structure, Europe would also “weatherize” itself from any drastic political fluctuations in the United States. A stronger European nuclear posture frees up United States resources for the Indo-Pacific but also accelerates their nuclear modernization. The European nuclear command would merge the Anglo-French nuclear command structure, while maintaining national control over the nuclear inventory, and ensure those European nuclear arms as ready, capable, and have a resilient command and control structure.   

Second, the European NATO nuclear deterrence serves all member countries but is only provided by the United Kingdom and France. There must be cost sharing from all European countries to support the European NATO Nuclear Command its nuclear forces.

This is no small matter. The UK’s new Dreadnought-class nuclear-armed submarines are currently being built and are due to enter service by the early 2030s at an estimated cost of £41bn ($52bn.) That excludes the cost of new Trident-replacement missiles. The French Le Triomphant–class program is expected to deliver the first boast by 2035 and to cost a similar sum. Once complete, the eight French and UK ballistic missile submarines will provide a continuous at-sea deterrent, with at least three patrolling at any given time. In addition, France is updating its tactical nuclear arsenal through the AMSPA-R missile. The UK has no tactical nuclear devices.

This is an extremely expensive business and European NATO currently makes no contribution. This would need to change. Even if France and the UK continue to carry the main financial burden, the other 28 European alliance members should also carry a significant part of the cost and should also offer support infrastructure and port facilities. There is no fairness in a system where Londoners pay for Europe’s strategic deterrent but Berliners don’t.

Third, all NATO countries would need to accept, even if only in transit and temporarily, nuclear arms on their territory. From a first-strike and second-strike perspective, the less the potential adversary knows about the positioning of nuclear arms, the harder it becomes to achieve a calculated first strike, which increases deterrence. Countries like Sweden and Finland will not have the option to opt-out from nuclear arms, permanent, temporary, or in transit, as any limitation in launch sites and flight paths undermines deterrence.

Fourth, increased focus on low-yield nuclear arms raises the risks for an aggressor and increases the ability, if necessary, to fight an adversary. Russia has used the last decades to create a variety of low-yield and “designer nukes” for tactical and operational missions. The very significant imbalance between strategic and tactical weapons undermines deterrence as a Russian 1 kiloton (KT) strike, in a larger context, will either be answered by a 10-megaton (MT) weapon or no action at all, if proportionality drives the response. (The current French tactical nuclear armory provides some options but is thought to be small.)

The Russians have developed a variety of niche nuclear arms, many of which are not matched by NATO capabilities. Some argue that such weapons lower the threshold for a nuclear engagement, but the inability to properly respond undermines deterrence, which is a far greater risk for the utilization of nuclear arms. An effective deterrent requires that you have abilities and options, which increase uncertainty for the potential aggressor.

Fifth, NATO and the US potential adversaries are increasing their research in electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons in all forms and at a broad scale – and enable strikes on NATO and US assets to cripple and degrade, especially in the earliest hours of a war.

The military research and creation of countermeasures using EMP, High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP), and high-energy microwave weapons are spread between cyber (electronic warfare, or EW), navies, air forces, and civilian infrastructure protection agencies in a variety of countries.

A European NATO nuclear command could accelerate, focus, and drive the research and weaponization, offensive and defensive, of EMP and HEMP weapons and countermeasures, leading to the fielding of these capabilities as both strategic capabilities to additional cyber (EW) capabilities at an operational and tactical level. The EMP and HEMP research community is closely related to the nuclear community, and together with cyber and EW, multiple benefits can be achieved.

The European NATO nuclear command would lower and share costs among European allies that benefit from the deterrence achieved. Such a unified nuclear force would be more capable, more modern, and provide a wider variety of options, without creating nuclear proliferation. The European NATO nuclear command is a viable solution to increased security and deterrence against a nuclear attack on the European NATO.  

Jan Kallberg, Ph.D., LL.M., is a non-resident Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), a Fellow at the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and a George Washington University faculty member. Follow him at cyberdefense.com and @Cyberdefensecom. 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.