What has often been circumscribed as “the rise of the rest”—the relative ascendancy of the non-Western powers—has been felt particularly acutely in Asia. When the Portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama reached India’s southwestern Kerala coast in 1498, it marked the start of 500 years of European (and later U.S.) dominance over Asia—colonial, imperial, and geopolitical. Decolonization from the middle of the 20th century onward did not much alter Western dominance, nor did it end Asia’s deference to Europe.
Until now, that is. The rapid growth of Asian economies and the redistribution of global power in favor of the East heralds a new era in the relationship between Europe and Asia. What began as a shift in economic power is now extending to the geopolitical, military, and technological realms.
Europe has already become a military theater for Asian actors. Large-scale deliveries of drones, ammunition, and weapons components from Iran, North Korea, and China are helping Russia fight Ukrainian forces and rain death on civilians in Ukrainian cities. Iranian military advisors have been reported on the ground in occupied Ukraine, although the Iranian government denies their presence there. Beijing, too, is a major supporter of Moscow’s war effort—economically, but also through the delivery of weapons components, even if Beijing has been careful so far in order to avoid Western sanctions.
And just last week, Chinese soldiers arrived in western Belarus, only a few miles from the border of Poland—a NATO member state—for 11 days of joint military exercises dubbed Eagle Assault 2024. China and Russia held their own first joint naval exercises in the Mediterranean Sea last year; joint drills between the two have been taking place in the Baltic Sea since 2017. Slowly but surely, Beijing is making it clear that it has military ambitions in Europe.
China’s military reach into Europe might still be modest now, but it will only grow with time. The fact that Chinese troops participating, for the first time, in exercises only a few miles from NATO’s eastern border underlines the extent to which Europe and Asia are trading places—with the former becoming the strategic object of the latter. As China, India, and other rising Asian countries grow more powerful, they increasingly see Europe as the theater of their geopolitical ambitions.
With the European Union roiled by internal divisions and failing to act as a coherent strategic actor in the face of multiple wars and conflicts in its region, the tables have turned. Whereas once-weak Asian powers used to be the object of Europe’s strategic calculations, it will now be the other way around.
Asia’s growing agency in Europe is also demonstrated as many European leaders—who failed to prevent and stop Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—turn to Chinese President Xi Jinping in hopes that he will persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin to end his war. Xi, who was received with much fanfare in Paris, Belgrade, and Budapest earlier this year, is reveling in his ability to play both sides of the war in Europe. But what the Chinese leader clearly understands is that helping Moscow succeed in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe will make it easier for Beijing to secure primacy in Asia. If the West is tied down by the Russian threat in Europe, Beijing calculates, the Western ability to stand up to the Chinese challenge in Asia will inevitably diminish. In this sense, Europe’s biggest and deadliest conflict since 1945 is China’s first major proxy war against the United States.
Europe is similarly eager for help with peace diplomacy in Ukraine from India, which has not condemned the Russian invasion. Instead of falling in line with the West on Ukraine, New Delhi has been scolding Europe for its lack of understanding of India’s concerns. New Delhi continues to buy and process large quantities of Russian oil (and resell some of it to Europe) while pushing forward its engagement with Moscow.
But India’s interest in Europe is different from China’s. New Delhi considers Europe a future partner for economic and strategic cooperation—and it has no desire to see Europe separated from Washington or weaken either. It needs both powers to balance China in Asia. Europe has steadily risen in India’s geopolitical calculus in recent years. At the same time, New Delhi has long seen Moscow as an important element of Asia’s geopolitical equilibrium. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi traveled to Moscow in early July to strengthen bilateral relations; Modi also hopes that Moscow can still be persuaded not to become a junior partner to Beijing.
“Divide and rule” was the European colonial powers’ old maxim for gaining control of Asia. Today, Asia’s great powers are learning the art of probing European fault lines—whether it’s Russia courting Hungarian President Viktor Orban or Chinese support for those European leaders who seek to defy the United States to pursue the EU goal of “strategic autonomy” or their countries’ expansive commercial interests in China. Naturally, a more autonomous Europe would be an ideal outcome for Beijing. Besides exploiting the trans-Atlantic divide on geopolitics, Moscow and Beijing have more than enough room to work with anti-Americanism on the left and right of the European political spectrum.
Asian powers are also increasingly involved on the Ukrainian side of the war. South Korea, which has emerged as a major weapons producer, is already selling arms to NATO—and could increase its support for Ukraine in response to North Korea’s increasing involvement on the Russian side. Japan has emerged as a major political and diplomatic supporter of Kyiv and will have a key role in the reconstruction of Ukraine when it begins.
The July NATO summit in Washington also showed the extent to which European defense has become a concern of Asian and Pacific powers. The Biden administration has persuaded its four Indo-Pacific allies—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—to become part of Europe’s security discourse. Leaders of the four countries, the so-called AP-4, have become regular participants at NATO summits.
A role for Asia in Europe is the flip side of U.S. President Joe Biden’s argument that Europe should do more to secure Asia against China. It is not clear if the Europeans have the capacity and strategic coherence to contribute to Asian security, but Asian leaders recognize their stakes in Europe.
Not all of Asia’s involvement in Europe is new. Although barely acknowledged today, Asians played a major role in European conflicts going back to the late 18th century. Consider the fact, for example, that British India contributed nearly 1 million soldiers to the Allies in World War I and 2 million to the Allies in World War II. Without those Indian troops, Europe’s map might look very different today.
Unlike in the past, Asia will no longer be a passive adjunct to European wars. Indeed, the Russia-Ukraine war suggests that Asian powers—with their own strategic interests in mind—will be direct participants in the future. The fact that Europe struggles to cope with demographic decline, shrinking armies, and diminishing willpower makes the involvement of Asian states in European security even more likely.
Asia’s geopolitical ambitions in and around Europe reach far beyond Ukraine. Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are playing an expanding role in the South Caucasus, Eastern Mediterranean, and Horn of Africa. Chinese and Persian Gulf capital—as well as Russian mercenaries—are quickly driving the French and other Europeans out of their former colonial bastions in Africa. With Europe unable to secure the arc of instability from the Eastern to the Southern Mediterranean, it will be external powers that will, rather sooner than later, control these gates to Europe.
Europe has a long tradition of underestimating Asia. In his 1968 book Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations, the Swedish scholar Gunnar Myrdal argued that Asia could not develop economically amid multiple structural constraints. Less than two decades later, Asia’s economic rise became one of the most consequential global trends.
Economically, too, Europe must now come to terms with the fact that Asia’s growth is no longer premised on cheap labor producing simple wares. East Asia leads in the production of semiconductors and electric vehicles. Europe still has niche capabilities and remains a powerhouse of science, but there is no escaping the fact that the continent has fallen behind on innovation and lags Asia in the production of certain advanced technological goods. India, meanwhile, has carved out a place for itself as the supplier of technological talent for new industries in the West.
As Asian powers set their eyes on Europe, the greatest source of worry for Europeans must be the fact that they are no longer at the center of the United States’ strategic affections. For more than a century, Europe has been the principal external theater of strategic interest for the United States. After the Second World War, the United States was willing to give its European interests higher priority than those in Asia. Today, U.S. military and strategic attention is increasingly focused on competition with China in Asia. Although the United States is unlikely to completely abandon Europe—not even if former President Donald Trump wins another term in the November U.S. presidential election—it will be a lesser priority than Asia.
None of this is to say that Europe has no options in dealing with a world in which Asia looms large. If it manages to shed its historic condescension toward the East, Europe could find new and mutually beneficial ways of working with Asian powers. For one, Europe must recognize that Asia is not united. Divides and outright confrontations abound—including between China and Japan, South Korea and Japan, Vietnam and China, Cambodia and Vietnam, and India and China.
Europe has a long tradition of engaging with Asia, not least through its past colonial presence. But today’s Europe has taken a long holiday from Asian geopolitics thanks to its illusions about the rise of a post-conflict world; its replacement of foreign policy with mercantilism; its outsourcing of security—and even strategic thinking—to the United States; and its self-deceptions about being an empire of norms wielding not much more than the power of example.
A Europe that actively engages with Asian geopolitics and pays due respect to the rise and agency of Asian powers will find it possible to upgrade its Asian ties—even as it modernizes its relationship with the United States. By sharing Washington’s burdens in the East and treating Asia as a geopolitical equal, Europe can regain its place on the global chessboard.