Dark Times May Return to France — the Allies Cannot Just Watch

If the populist-right Rassemblement National (RN) party wins an absolute majority of seats in the National Assembly on Sunday, July 7, France could tip over to the dark side of history.

Not only will its support for Ukraine come to an end, and the new government will gradually reopen lines to Moscow, but Paris will be marginalized within the European Union, NATO, and international bodies.

This radical change may not be immediate, as there are still forces of resistance (civil society, trade unions, intellectuals) and checks and balances (Constitutional Council, judicial institutions), but these are likely to be weakened, particularly if Marine Le Pen wins the presidential election in 2027.

In the wake of the first round of voting, which saw the populist right come out on top, there has been an upsurge in racist, anti-Semitic, and homophobic threats, including death threats against lawyers who called for opposition to the RN — in a document published on a website hosted in Russia.

Press revelations about the party’s candidates are also mounting, including allegations of personal links with Russia and participation in operations to control so-called elections or referendums there. Racist and anti-Semitic comments have also been uncovered, with some even admiring Nazi Germany or the Vichy regime, alongside conspiracy theories about vaccines or climate change.

The reality is a resurgence of French fascism, an old reality whose sleep was short-lived. Some candidates have even suggested the Constitutional Council should be brought to heel.

There are numerous statements by members of the RN denouncing the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights as obstacles to the “will of the people.” This contempt for the law, and the revival of xenophobic and brutal rhetoric, runs parallel to the positions of the American alt-right and other European populist right-wingers.

The fact the Kremlin has officially endorsed Marine Le Pen’s party is significant in itself. While the links between the far right and Vladimir Putin have long been established, this display means Moscow considers it will do no harm to the party it has carefully nurtured.

Some far-right voters are happy with the link, buying into the cult of the “strong man” who champions “Christian values” and disregarding Putin’s mass crimes in Ukraine, Syria, Chechnya, and Africa. A second category is indifferent, and votes for the RN over immigration, Islam, and questions of domestic security or living costs, ignoring the links with Moscow.

A third category draws its information only from social networks, themselves polarized by algorithms, and media already oriented toward the extreme right. In France, as elsewhere, a large proportion of voters cannot be swayed by purely factual arguments.

Despite soothing words of support for Kyiv from Jordan Bardella, president of the RN, his positions are clear: no military instructors to be sent to Ukraine, refusal to strike Russian territory with French weapons, and a warning against any action deemed “escalatory” or likely to imply “belligerence” on the part of France.

We know this rhetoric is borrowed directly from the Kremlin playbook.

The leaders of the RN have also denied the crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa, as well as those of the Syrian regime. They have never called for the condemnation of Russian leaders and their henchmen, despite Putin and other senior figures being indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court.

Nor have they called for the return of Ukrainian children deported to Russia, a crime of genocide under the Convention of December 9, 1948, instead denouncing the European Union’s sanctions against Russia and its officials since 2014.

We can predict that all French aid to Ukraine, both military and financial, either directly or via France’s contribution to the European Union, will gradually be halted.

The questioning of constitutional and international law, the detestation of liberal values, and the regular designation of the US and NATO as adversaries with a stranglehold on Europe, not to mention so-called “family values,” are all largely consistent with Moscow’s rhetoric.

Of course, an absolute victory for the populist right is not certain. It is to be hoped that, if the classical parties have enough representatives in the National Assembly, they can agree to form a government.

But it is urgent that Ukraine’s allies take precautionary measures. These will be immediately necessary if the RN wins, both to make up for the absence of French support and to prevent Paris from blocking decisions by the European Council or the Council of the Atlantic Alliance.

Even if French voters do decide to avoid the worst, France, plunged into the difficulties of a coalition government, would hardly be able to continue to play the leading role in Europe that it has in recent months.

President Macron will emerge weakened from this ordeal, and his leadership is likely to be blunted by the internal turbulence his decision has caused.

While he had begun to break down the red lines towards Russia some Allies retain, notably by suggesting the possibility of sending ground troops to Ukraine, the French position would risk falling far short.

It is not the only paradox of this high-risk situation that, for some of the Allies, the days of a stronger France will be missed.

Nicolas Tenzer, non-resident senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), is a guest professor at Sciences Po Paris and writes the international politics blog Tenzer Strategics. His latest book on Russia’s war against Ukraine, Notre Guerre. Le Crime et l’Oubli : pour une pensée stratégique (Our War. Crime and Oblivion: Reframing Strategic Thinking) was published in January by Éditions de l’Observatoire.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.