Europe Gathers in Churchill’s Shadow: A British Moment 

Some venues are more symbolic than others: prepared by Rishi Sunak, the meeting of 47 heads of state and government will be held on July 18 at Blenheim Palace, the birthplace of Winston Churchill. 

Like the three previous summits of the European Political Community (EPC) in Prague, Chișinău, and Granada, it is the Russian war against Ukraine that will dominate. But already, 13 days after his appointment, Prime Minister Keir Starmer faces a stiff test of his desire for improved relations with Europe, and from a darkening sky over the continent’s security. 

“It is my purpose,” Churchill wrote in The Gathering Storm, “first to show how easily the tragedy of the Second World War could have been prevented [and] how the malice of the wicked was reinforced by the weakness of the virtuous.” 

There is no obvious Churchill among the leaders of early 21^st century Europe, but whether they like it or not they face issues of enormous gravity, not least — now as then — the inviolability of borders. 

The agenda will address issues that affect Ukraine, as well as others that are important but perhaps slightly tangential to the key question of European security (like energy and connectivity). It is unlikely that what remains a loose forum — despite several calls, including our own, for a light secretariat — will see any joint resolutions adopted unless they craft a brief agreed statement, so great are the differences and often conflicts between those present. Some of those present even lean toward Moscow. 

Nor is the EPC a decision-making forum, and it comes on the heels of four important meetings: the G7, the undoubtedly misnamed Peace conference in Switzerland, the June European Council, and NATO’s 75th-anniversary summit in Washington. The EPC cannot compete with these other summits. 

The United Kingdom has certainly taken care to include a round table on defending and securing democracy, but neither Hungary, Slovakia, Georgia, or Azerbaijan is likely to take this issue seriously. It is even less certain, although President Zelenskyy is expected to speak, that any major changes will be made in favor of Ukraine, even if both Starmer and Emmanuel Macron reiterate their commitment. 

Nevertheless, it remains significant that three organizations — NATO, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe, whose membership is more or less the same as that of the EPC — have been invited to the summit, in addition to the European Commission, albeit in the absence of Ursula von der Leyen, who is required in Strasbourg, and the European Council. Even so, the European family should be virtually complete in terms of countries and organizations represented. 

The European Political Community is the 2022 brainchild of President Macron. He recognized and acted to fill the void between the continent and the United Kingdom, which had been widening since the 2016 Brexit vote, and more broadly the relationship between the EU and other non-EU countries, most of them having no desire to join the EU club. The wisdom of that decision has only been underlined since — the UK is a significant and active European military and intelligence power, something underlined by its actions following Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine (it is the biggest military contributor to Kyiv’s armed forces after the US and Germany). 

London was immediately enthusiastic about the idea, unlike Berlin, but it is Labour’s leader who should be looking to reap the rewards, especially as Paris is now undergoing a period of uncertainty. 

Starmer has already made his mark. While he has re-emphasized Britain’s support for Ukraine (which will henceforth total £3bn, or $3.9bn, annually) he has much broader ambitions. An opponent of Brexit who now accepts there will be no UK return in the foreseeable future (and it’s questionable whether EU members want it), he and his Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, have already set about reconnecting with continental leaders. Given the wait-and-see attitude towards the American elections on November 5, British leaders know that London will be a key player in European security and defense and that they need their European allies. 

A proposal has already emerged to extend the French-German-Polish Weimar Triangle to the UK, which would give it greater weight in the face of Russian threats in this particular area. However, it would need to be given clear content and objectives, particularly in terms of the defense industry.  

It remains to be seen, however, whether strategic differences can be resolved, particularly as regards Ukraine. Indeed, Warsaw and London are more committed to the goal of a total victory for Ukraine and a defeat for Russia than Berlin, which remains cautious, or even Paris, which, due to Macron’s political weakening, may be less able to achieve the more robust course he has pursued since February. 

The EPC’s Blenheim summit will certainly be a test of the UK’s return to the international stage. In meetings on the sidelines of the NATO summit, President Joe Biden had publicly argued that London’s rapprochement with Europe was in the interests of the United States. What Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda described as “the United Nations in Europe” could become all the more attractive if, tomorrow, Washington were to disassociate itself from the European continent. 

The immediate goal, the key test, of the current age is to secure a beneficial outcome for Ukraine to support its bloodied people, and to reestablish the sanctity of borders. 

The EPC is an immature forum, but its necessity is unquestionable. The British, generally suspicious of any security discussion outside NATO, may now accept that something is needed and may be needed very soon.  

There are great risks here. No political leader wants to be remembered as Churchill described the politicians of the 1930s; men of “virtuous motives, trammeled by inertia and timidity, [who were] no match for armed and resolute wickedness.” 

If the continent cannot unite on the necessity of defeating Russia, beginning in Ukraine, centrifugal tendencies will prevail — to Europe’s great misfortune. That would mark a Churchillian moment in reverse. 

Nicolas Tenzer, non-resident senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, is a guest professor at Sciences Po Paris and writes the international politics blog Tenzer Strategics. His latest book on Russia’s war against Ukraine, Notre Guerre. Le Crime et l’Oubli : pour une pensée stratégique (Our War. Crime and Oblivion: Reframing Strategic Thinking was published in January by Éditions de l’Observatoire.  

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.