Any extreme, near-term political shift on Ukraine arising from European Parliament election results — which saw the center largely hold, but the right gain ground — appears unlikely, partly due to splits within the far right. Marine Le Pen’s RN in France, which polled strongly and is part of the parliament’s far-right ID group, has tamed its former pro-Russia views. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni — whose far-right Brothers of Italy performed well, including against Ukraine-skeptic Italian parties — continues to be a strong advocate for Ukraine. Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which opposes sanctions on Russia and aid to Ukraine, outpolled each of Germany’s three governing parties but is finding itself isolated within the European Parliament. In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s far-right, pro-Russia Hungarian Civic Alliance party lost ground to a centrist offshoot.
Further, no major shake-ups are expected in the European Commission’s top jobs, with Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas — who takes a very tough line on Russia — tipped to be the next foreign affairs chief, and Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen likely to retain her post. At a legislative level, the EU last week passed its 14th sanctions package — critically, just ahead of Hungary’s Orban taking over the rotating six-month EU presidency from July. And the EU signed a security pact with Ukraine at a Jun. 27-28 summit.
But threats to ongoing support for Ukraine still lurk. The key is sentiment at the national level, as voters push back against incumbent governments over the rising cost of living, among other issues like immigration. “If there are costs associated with Ukraine when it comes to support in the short term or long-term accession to the EU … I think the support for that is way more brittle than public opinion shows you,” says Catherine de Vries, a professor at Italy’s Bocconi University. She notes protests by Polish farmers worried about cheaper exports from Ukraine, and declines in support for Ukraine when gas prices spiked. Some center-right politicians in Germany now say welfare payments to Ukrainian refugees are too high, perhaps eyeing regional elections later this year.
Political changes at the national level could also unseat or weaken some Ukraine champions — as seen in the Netherlands, where outgoing Prime Minister Mark Rutte, a staunch Ukraine ally, will head to Nato. The country’s new right-wing government includes Geert Wilders’ far-right Party for Freedom, which opposed Ukraine aid when campaigning but has since pledged support. Most consequential could be the snap French National Assembly poll taking place on Jun. 30 and Jul. 7, complicating French President Emmanuel Macron’s full-throated Ukraine support. Germany also faces national elections next year. The lack of a real political narrative around why Ukrainian support is in Europe’s core interest, as a part of a larger discussion about democracy and autocracy, could affect people’s willingness to bear any associated costs, de Vries argues.
French Funding Threat
If the RN were to win a majority in France’s National Assembly across the two-round vote, it would control the purse strings, with impacts on Macron’s foreign affairs and defense portfolios — and his push to throw more military support behind Kyiv. RN’s young president, Jordan Bardella, recently said he has “fought to hold a reasonable position, saying yes to supporting Ukraine but no to a full-on war with Russia.” RN lawmakers abstained from a National Assembly vote on military aid to Ukraine in March, and Bardella opposes sending French troops to Ukraine or allowing Kyiv to use long-range French weapons to strike inside Russia — positions mooted by Macron. A February security pact with Ukraine providing up to €3 billion ($3.2 billion) per year in military support is still awaiting ratification by the National Assembly.
“There’s a real risk of de-funding if the RN gets a majority,” says Jacob Kirkegaard, a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund’s Brussels office. But polling right now, he says, doesn’t point to a clear RN majority, suggesting France could be heading for a hung parliament. The RN would also likely put the brakes on Macron’s push for a European defense initiative — and an overall more centralized and muscular EU.
Holding the Line?
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz claimed the AfD’s strong showing in European elections reflected disagreement within Germany over support for Ukraine and Russia sanctions. But it may also be politically expedient for Scholz to distract attention from his coalition’s poor approval ratings and his Social Democratic party’s worst-ever results at the European level. Cost of living is likely a key factor in the AfD’s rise in Germany’s east, along with climate policy. Differences over Ukraine, however, mean there is “zero probability” of any long-term collaboration between the leading center-right Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (the party of European Commissioner Von der Leyen) and the AfD at the national level, Kirkegaard argues, looking ahead to elections next year.
Germany’s budget deficit crisis could also complicate further Ukraine funding. True, there could be wiggle room around the self-imposed German debt brake, and Germany’s €100 billion defense fund has not been fully spent. But Scholz has faced criticism for delays in approving weapons deliveries to Ukraine, is less hawkish than France’s Macron on confronting Russia in Ukraine, and tends to be more concerned about costs to German business and the economy.
In Italy, Meloni continues to defy initial expectations that she would lean toward Russia, although her support for Ukraine stops short of supplying weapons for Kyiv to use inside Russia. Popular support for Ukraine within Italy also appears fairly strong.
Fear Factor, US Risk
In the near term, the steady uptick in Russia’s hybrid warfare in Europe is good reason for the West to hold its line — it instills a “very real fear” among European leaders that Moscow is “trying to undermine the whole European security order,” Constanze Stelzenmuller, director of the Washington-based Brookings’ Center on the United States and Europe, told a Financial Times webinar earlier this month. But more than any political outcome in Europe, the real risk of a dramatic shift in Ukraine support lies in a Donald Trump presidency in the US, Kirkegaard argues — with potential threats to critical US military support, intelligence-sharing and use of Starlink satellites. This could, in turn, embolden Europe’s Russia-leaning far right.