The European Mutiny: The Consequences are Just Beginning

In the European Parliament elections this month, voters in most of the European Union’s 27 countries rallied to parties that hold the remote EU Establishment in contempt.

In France, the once-taboo National Rally party outpolled the party of President Macron by more than 2 to 1; in Germany, the party of Scholtz, the SPD (a veteran German party) collapsed to 13% voter support, at the same time that the other components to the governing coalition collapsed. The Greens sank to 12% and the FDP were at borderline 5% of the popular vote (5% is the entry-level to Germany’s parliament).

Much has been written to argue that European Parliamentary Centre ‘held’, yet even that hangs in the balance until the newly-elected MEPs first assemble to approve the clutch of EU top jobs: i.e. the three ‘Presidents’ — Presidents of the Commission, the Council, and of Parliament; plus the High Representative (i.e. the EU’s ‘Foreign Minister’).

For now, the composition of the European Parliament is the subject of intense internecine struggle. These were elections only to the European Parliament — a body that does not initiate legislation in the EU, but which is supposed to exercise a general surveillance.

The real elections in Europe these days are the national elections.

That in itself is a ‘pointer’:  Decisive voting is taking place at the national level, and not at the supranational centre in Brussels.

The ‘real’ elections are taking place in France and the UK, despite the latter being outside the EU.  The UK vote nonetheless will be an important litmus of European opinion, precisely because its Ruling Strata has become known for its compliance with US policies.  

The anti-Establishment and anti-bureaucracy outpouring amongst voters has astonished and disconcerted the élites. The governing party — the venerable Conservative Party — is being routed, and might not survive as a meaningful political entity after 4 July.

In Germany, Scholtz’s ‘traffic light’ coalition also may not survive — following its calamitous EU election.  Scholz’s government has a budget shortfall of €40bn. That is the estimated amount Scholz and his coalition partners need to cut in federal spending in order to plug the gap. Within Germany’s ruling parties, there is a consensus forming that the severely weakened coalition cannot survive another grinding dispute on the budget, as happened last year after a ruling by Germany’s top court blew a €60 billion hole in the country’s finances. 

Then there are, in September, key state votes ahead in Brandenburg, Thuringia, and Saxony. According to polls, the (populist-rightist) Alternative for Germany (AfD) party is winning in each region, all of which are located in the eastern or central part of the country. Within the Former East Germany, 40% of the votes in the Euro-elections went to either the AfD, or the party of Sara Wagenkecht – a new party espousing contrarian policies.

In France, the situation for the élite class looks equally dire: A series of opinion polls over the past few days reflect the darkening clouds engulfing Macron’s centrist alliance. The polls show the National Rally inching closer to a majority in France’s lower house of parliament, the National Assembly.

If the National Rally does win a majority, the impact of a putative Rally premiership, led by Jordan Bardella, would have major repercussions extending far beyond France — to the EU and beyond. A confrontational stance by the party toward Brussels is a given. And whilst in Italy, Giorgia Meloni has tried to accommodate Brussels on key policy stances, there’s no guarantee Bardella would follow suit.  Or that Meloni will not switch to ally with Bardella.

This ‘mutiny’ has been long in the making:  EU policies such as immigration, Green farm policies, and heavy-handed bureaucracy have ignited huge anger; but there is one burning issue that largely is kept under the table, and spoken of in hushed tones — Ukraine.

The Biden-faction within Brussels is wholly invested in the US project for escalation of the war in Ukraine against Russia (at least until November), and thereafter Europe is expected to prepare for a later full-scale confrontation with Russia — possibly mounted to mesh with US military action against China, for which the Pentagon is busy preparing.  

Of course, ‘all’ hangs on the US election outcome.

The elephant in the ‘planning room’ is that Europeans do not want war with Russia — however hard it is pushed by the Ruling Strata. It is manifestly not in the European interest.

The National Rally is opposed to support for Ukraine, and even Scholtz, the most faithful leader to a Washington ‘lead’ admitted in an interview on Sunday, that the SPD had as little as 7% support in some parts of eastern Germany, which traditionally has been more positively predisposed toward Russia.

“Something is going on there; No way around it”, Scholtz exclaimed.

He then acknowledged that the dire ratings for the SPD stemmed from the fact that “many people do not agree with the support for Ukraine and the sanctions against Russia. This is also reflected in the [wider, poor] election results”, Scholz stated. “There is no alternative [but] to changing that”. 

And even in the UK which traditionally tries ‘to be out, in front’ of the US on security issues, the Establishment swooned when Nigel Farage whose Reform party is within a whisker of overtaking the governing Conservative Party in terms of popular esteem said the ‘unsayable’:

He said that NATO’s forever expansions towards Russia’s borders were the cause of the Ukraine war. You (metaphorically) could ‘hear a pin drop’ as he broke ranks and uttered the unsayable.

Now, Farage – whether you like him or not – is a consummate politician — unlike Sunak or Starmer, who are anything ‘but’.  Farage knows how to tell which way the wind blows. 

France and Germany together, historically provide Europe’s engine. For years, however, the EU has built itself by usurping the prerogatives of Europe’s nation-states, only to reinvest them at the supra-national level — for ever.  

By the start of this century, London, Berlin, Rome and Athens were much less self-governing than they used to be — to the alarm of voters: Brexit was one result.

“Europeans”, C. Caldwell writes in the New York Times, “for the most part, were not aware that they had been enlisted in a project that has as its end point the extinction of France, Germany, Italy and the rest of Europe’s historic nations – as meaningful political units. Brussels has been able to win assent to its project only by concealing its nature. Europe’s younger generation appears however to have seen through the dissembling. We are only at the beginning of the consequences”.

Brussels may try to claim that the ‘Centre held’; that their Ukraine, Green immigration and centralizing policies can continue unaffected. But Caldwell is correct: we are only at the beginning of the consequences, should they try to insist.  The “real problem with the union [is] not what it does but what it is …a ruthless state-building project like those of Cardinal Richelieu under Louis XIII”.  

The European Union’s governing machinery in Brussels has never been where voters’ interests – or hearts – lie.